economy.
Similarly, we also respectfully recommend that Article 4 be revised as follows:
The State shall formulate and implement competition rules that are compatible with promoting consumer welfare and economic efficiency the socialist market economy, in order to improve macro-economic regulation and build up a sound market network that operates in an integrated, open, competitive, and orderly manner.
Experience has taught us that robust and undistorted competition produces substantial benefits for consumers and society as a whole by promoting growth, spurring innovation, and facilitating the efficient allocation of resources. It has also taught us that competition law and policy is most effective when it focuses exclusively upon competition and consumer welfare rather than attempting to achieve simultaneously multiple goals, some of which may be in conflict with others.
Indeed, economies with competitive domestic markets tend to have higher levels and rates of growth per capita income, 3 and industries with greater competition experience faster productivity growth. 4 Competition in the domestic market creates efficient, productive firms that are better able to compete on global markets, which in turn increases economic growth and standards of living. 5 A competitive market also enhances the innovative efforts of a society. A market mechanism achieves much of its efficiency and its adaption to consumer desires through financial incentives, by providing higher payoffs to those firms that are more efficient and whose products are most closely adapted to the wishes of consumers. The same mechanism obviously drives innovation in an even more powerful way. For oligopoly firms in high-tech sectors of the economy, it is in fact a matter of survival. The firm that lets its rival outperform it substantially in innovative products and processes is faced with the prospect of imminent demise.
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Studies such as the McKinsey Global Institute's survey of the economic performance of thirteen nations further support this assessment. 8 The McKinsey survey supports the consensus view among economists that productivity makes a crucial difference in economic development and that the presence or absence of undistorted competition among firms is critical to productivity. When competition is distorted, firms that fail to meet the demands of the market to produce what consumers want at competitive prices are not pressured to either improve or to exit the market. As a result, an entire economy becomes less competitive. Investment lags, jobs are more scarce (or less numerous), goods and services are more expensive, and more of what consumers spend goes to enriching monopolists instead of their own lives.
In addition, the use of non-competition factors in competition analysis raises a number of other concerns, such as the difficulty of balancing competition and non-competition factors across different markets and balancing efficiency concerns against equity concerns; the likelihood that public policy issues may undermine consumer welfare considerations; undermining clarity and predictability in antitrust enforcement; and the lack of expertise by competition officials to weigh non-competition factors.
9 Indeed, the failed experiment of the United States in seeking to use its antitrust laws to serve a hodgepodge of social and political goals, many with an explicitly anticompetitive bent such as protecting small traders from more Arnold et al.] (finding that productivity growth is largely driven by reallocation from less to more productive firms). 6 See, e.g., R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Promoting Economic Growth and Innovation, Address before the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Law (July 1, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/promoting-economic-growth-throughcompetition-and-innovation. 7 Lastly, Article 7 provides, in relevant part, that "with respect to the industries that are under the control of the State-owned economic sector that have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries that exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to state law, the State shall protect the lawful business operations" of such undertakings. We respectfully urge that this provision be omitted entirely or, at the very least, revised so that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not exempt from the AML other than the protections afforded by Article 7 of China's Constitution (which provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state economy," i.e., "the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people"). " [A] pplying the AML [to State monopolies] does not mean a challenge to the constitutional privilege of those enterprises but, rather, it sets limits to which that privilege can be exercised, such as refraining from abusing a State-granted dominant position."
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Conferring upon SOEs privileges and immunities that are not available to their privatelyowned competitors, or are not based on superior performance or efficiency, distorts competition in the market between state-owned and privately-owned rivals. 12 In addition, in general, SOEs are not as efficient as privately-owned firms given that, unlike private firms, which are generally driven by profit, SOEs may have a number of other objectives including employment, social goals, or wealth distribution. Use of SOEs to achieve non-market goals is generally a costly way to achieve such goals. These incentives can significantly affect their performance in the market and unnecessarily increase the costs of achieving those non-market goals.
13 SOEs generate increased agency problems relative to privately owned firms. The incentives of managers of SOEs are less aligned with those of the general public given the absence of the types of market incentives that align the interest of the firm with that of its shareholders.
14 As a result, the decision-making in private firms tend to be less burdensome than in SOEs, and there is more accountability based on the outcome of management's decisions. 15 Indeed, managers in SOEs are less likely to be dismissed for poor performance and the state is more likely to provide financial assistance to a mismanaged SOE than to a privately-owned firm.
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Chapter II. Monopoly Agreements-Vertical Restraints (Questions 5-6)
We respectfully recommend that, should the AML be revised to add a specific provision governing vertical restraints, the provision should explicitly recognize that the vast majority of such restraints are either procompetitive or innocuous and as such should be analyzed under the rule of reason, or under an effects-based approach in which restraints are condemned only when any anticompetitive harm they cause outweighs any procompetitive benefits they create.
Economic theory and experience show that vertical restraints (which include vertical territorial restrictions, resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, tying, and other related business practices) rarely harm competition and often benefit consumers by reducing price, increasing demand, and/or creating a more efficient distribution channel.
17 As the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Director of the Bureau of Economics explained, "it appears that when manufacturers choose to impose [vertical] restraints, not only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision."
18
To assess the competitive effects of a vertical restraint, as with any antitrust analysis, one must compare the world with the restraint (which is observed) to the world without the restraint (which typically is not observed). The critical element of this analysis is to specify properly the "counterfactual"-that is, the world without the restraint. Economic analysis provides important tools to help competition agencies and courts with this fundamental comparison. In general, it is possible to draw inferences about the unobserved state of the world in either of two ways. First, if a "natural experiment" mimics the effect of the restraint and other factors that might affect price, output, or other variables can be held constant, then it is possible to estimate the competitive effects of the restraint by comparing a control group (without the restraint) to an experimental group (with the restraint). Second, it is possible to use a theoretical economic model of competition among firms to infer the competitive impact of the restraint when one cannot measure it directly.
However, a significant difficulty in relying principally upon theoretical models to infer competitive effects in the context of vertical restraints is that the conditions necessary for vertical 17 See, e.g., James C. 6 restraints to harm welfare generally are the same conditions under which the practices increase consumer welfare. For example, pre-existing market power typically is necessary for vertical integration to raise price to unintegrated levels; but vertical integration under these conditions normally would also eliminate double-marginalization, 19 which is procompetitive and generally results in higher output, lower prices, and increased consumer welfare. As such, given the state of economic learning regarding the competitive effects of vertical restraints (i.e., that they rarely harm competition and often benefit consumers), reliance on theoretical models alone to infer competitive harm should generally be insufficient to satisfy the heavy burden on the plaintiff (or government) to prove that a particular restraint is anticompetitive.
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Chapter III. Abuse of Market Dominant Position-Charging "Unfairly high" or Buying at "Unfairly Low" Prices, Refusal to Deal, and Collective Dominance (Questions 1-3)
As a threshold matter, we respectfully urge that the definition of a market dominant position in Article 17 be revised to clarify that an entity will be found to have a dominant market position only if it is able profitably to maintain market prices above or market output below competitive levels for a significant period of time.
It is worth noting that there has been a movement in the United States away from focusing upon market definition and market power to infer competitive effects. In particular, the U.S. antitrust agencies increasingly have shifted their focus to a direct assessment of incentives and competitive effects, as evidenced by the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and away from using market shares to predict whether a firm possesses market power or is likely to increase prices. This shift in antitrust analysis is consistent with modern economics and is particularly important in matters involving IPRs; IPR holders may need relatively high margins (prices above marginal cost) merely to recoup their upfront investment and compensate for the substantial risks associated with seeking to create and commercialize intellectual property. Prices well above their low or even zero marginal cost are normal features of competitive markets in such industries, such as pioneer pharmaceuticals. In other words, a price above marginal cost in such an industry may result in no more than the competitive rate of return on the investment necessary 7 to create the IPR. 21 Relatedly, the lines between markets may be not be clearly delineated in high-tech markets involving IPRs, such as smart phones. To infer a firm has market power based merely upon its high market share or its ability to charge a price greater than marginal cost is to invite error.
We respectfully urge that Article 17(1), which prohibits selling products at "unfairly high" or purchasing products at "unfairly low" prices, be deleted in its entirety or, at the very least, revised to provide explicitly an exception for goods or services involving IPRs.
Price regulation risks punishing vigorous competition. In general, competition policy should not prohibit an entity from charging whatever price for its products and services it believes will maximize its profits. As we explained in our comments on Chapter I, above, markets achieve efficiency through incentives and the ability to adapt to ever-changing market conditions and consumer preferences. Firms that adapt and innovate to satisfy consumer demand are rewarded with greater economic profits. Government-mandated prices are necessarily less flexible than market prices. Thus, imposed prices that are too high or too low encourage the misallocation of resources, soften incentives to engage in efficient conduct, reduce incentives to innovate, and distort markets. 22 The ability of prices to change in order to reflect changing demand and supply conditions is well understood by economists to lie at the center of the causal relationship between markets, productivity, and growth. "Price legitimately plays an important role in the central economic models: as a conduit of information to the market it is an indispensable variable of general equilibrium theory."
23 Most markets are competitive and monopoly tends to be self-correcting. But even when markets are not competitive, the costs of price regulation are likely to outweigh its benefits. 24 Indeed, excessive pricing cases are considered to be among the most difficult and complex cases for competition authorities in terms of standards for assessment, analysis of data, and the design and implementation of suitable remedies. These difficulties create a substantial risk of both Type I errors (false positives) and Type II errors (false negatives).
In the United States, the antitrust laws incorporate these concerns. Firms are free unilaterally to set or privately to negotiate their prices, and even a monopolist is free to charge the highest price that it can obtain for its goods and services, which rewards the risk-taking and entrepreneurial behavior by firms that lead to innovation and economic growth. 25 8 monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
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This is especially so in the case of IPRs; the very purpose for which nations create and protect IPRs is to induce investment in risky and costly research and development. To achieve a balance between innovation and the protection of competition, monopoly prices should be unlawful only if they are the result of conduct that is unlawful on other grounds.
Moreover, as discussed, economics teaches that absent market information it can be especially difficult to identify a "fair" price. Indeed, it is particularly difficult to assess the "fairness" of prices associated with licensing IPRs both because there is no marginal cost to which the price may be compared, and because IPRs themselves are highly differentiated products making price comparisons difficult, if not impossible. The risk of placing too strict limitations on intellectual property prices is that the profitability of innovative behavior is reduced, and consumers suffer in the form of less innovation. With such limits in place, IPRs holders will face significant uncertainty in determining whether their licensing practices violate the AML.
In addition, in order to determine whether a particular price is excessive or unreasonable, the competition agency would need to calculate a reasonable price as a baseline against which to compare the allegedly excessive price. In our experience, competition agencies are generally illequipped to calculate rates, a task that is best left to the market or, as a last resort, to the courts. 27 With respect to Article 17(3), which prohibits a dominant firm from "refusing to transact with counter-parties to a transaction without any justification," we respectfully urge that this provision be revised to limit any liability to conduct that creates or maintains a monopoly. Without such a limitation, Article 17(3) could be interpreted to impose on firms an antitrustbased duty to deal, to micromanage the terms of trade between firms, and to require courts and agencies to administer a burdensome remedy with substantial risk of causing more harm than benefits to competition and to consumers. In light of these risks, the U. . . to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 28 As the Court recently explained in Trinko, the rationale behind this rule includes the "uncertain virtue of 26 Id. Although a firm's competitors may desire to use a particular good or technology in their own products, there are few situations, if any, in which access to a particular good or technology is necessary to compete in a market. Indeed, those who advocate forced sharing often have underestimated the ability of a determined rival to compete around the facility, with resulting benefits to consumers. This is particularly true with respect to fast moving technologies, where technological and market developments can present multiple opportunities to work (or design) around a competitor's product or intellectual property. Recognizing these concerns, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that courts should be very cautious in recognizing exceptions to the general rule that even monopolists may choose with whom they deal. 30 The U.S. approach recognizes that potential inventors may be less likely to undertake the research and development that lead to an invention if the inventor's reward for its efforts is reduced by having to share its technology or goods. Conversely, if businesses know they can easily gain access to the goods or technology of other firms, then they have less incentive to innovate and more incentive instead to free-ride on the risky and expensive research of others.
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Requiring businesses to transact with competitors is likely to result in less innovation, which will harm consumers in the long run.
With respect to Article 19, which provides market shares above which a dominant position would be presumed, we respectfully urge that this provision be omitted in its entirety. Specifically, Article 19(1) provides that if a firm has a market share of 50 percent or more, it may be presumed to have a dominant market position. Most important, presumptions based on market shares discourage more rigorous effects-based economic analyses of the restraint at issue in favor of relying upon easier to apply but less accurate forms of analysis. Further, the experience in the United States counsels that a market share of 50 percent is too low to provide a firm with monopoly power, and that even when a firm has a high market share (e.g., above 60 or 70 percent), whether the firm has a dominant market position is a fact-specific issue that must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Such an analysis includes an examination of barriers to entry, the likelihood of leapfrog competition, and the durability of high market shares, to determine whether the firm actually has the power profitably to maintain prices above or output below competitive levels for a significant period of time.
Article 19(2)-(3) provide for presumptions concerning collective dominance. These presumptions may harm rather than promote competition. For example, treating the second and third largest firms in a market as dominant is likely to deter them from competing aggressively against the market leader, which is likely to harm competition given that they are often in the best position to compete most effectively against the market leader. As such, we respectfully urge that this provision be omitted in its entirety, or at the very least, revised to require concerted 29 540 U.S. at 408. 30 See id. 31 
See id.
action as a joint monopoly, which is the approach generally required by the European Commission.
Chapter IV. Concentration of Undertakings
We respectfully recommend that Article 20, which defines concentration of undertakings, be revised to define the phrases "control over other undertakings" and "the ability capable of exerting a decisive influence . . . by virtue of contract or any other means."
We also respectfully recommend that Article 21, which sets forth a mandatory premerger approval process, be revised to provide an exemption for transactions that do not have a material nexus with China based on objectively quantifiable criteria such as sales or assets in China. As the International Competition Network has recommended, "[n]otification should not be required unless the transaction is likely to have significant, direct, and immediate economic effect" within the jurisdiction as measured by significant local activities by each of at least two parties to the transaction or by the acquired business.
32 Such revisions will provide transparency and predictability for stakeholders and allow the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to focus on transactions that are most likely to raise competition concerns, and to avoid unnecessary transaction costs and the commitment of agency resources without any corresponding enforcement benefit.
Article 24(5) provides that one of the factors that "shall" be taken into consideration when determining whether to approve a concentration of undertakings is "the impact of their concentration on the development of the national economy." Similarly, Article 28 provides, in relevant part, that when a concentration leads or may lead to the elimination or restriction of competition, if the undertakings prove that "the concentration is in the public interest," MOFCOM may decide not to prohibit the concentration. For the reasons set forth in Chapter I, above, in our discussion of the use of non-competition factors, we respectfully urge that these provisions be omitted.
Chapter V. Abusing Administrative Power to Eliminate and Restrict Competition
Chapter V, among other things, wisely prohibits administrative departments from enacting regulations that would eliminate or restrict competition. However, "Article 51 adds a provision that could detract from the clarity of the main provision" 33 :
If administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs abuse their administrative power and engage in activities eliminating or restricting competition, their superior authority shall order them to make corrections. The officials and other personnel who are directly responsible for such activities shall be punished by law. The Anti-monopoly Enforcement 11 Agency shall provide the superior authority with advice as to how such officials or personnel should be punished by law.
This provision is problematic as written because the "superior authority," which could be any type of agency, likely lacks the expertise and experience to determine whether a particular activity eliminates or restricts competition. Moreover, having numerous agencies interpret the AML is likely to result in conflicting decisions that would create costly confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders. In addition, it is "difficult for a superior agency to keep a neutral attitude in a dispute between its inferior agency and the non-State-owned enterprises or competitors from another region."
34 As such, we respectfully recommend that this provision be omitted in its entirety and that the AML agencies be permitted to enforce the AML against administrative regulations that eliminate or restrict competition, including issuing findings of liability, requiring the discontinuation of any violations, confiscating unlawful gains, and/or imposing relevant fines.
In discussing this topic, it is worthwhile to discuss the economics of regulation, namely regulatory capture and public choice. The theoretical basis for economic regulation rests on the idea that regulation may be necessary to correct a definable market failure in a particular industry. Of course, there may be multiple ways to solve this problem other than resorting to regulation, including private ordering. Successful identification of a market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition to justify regulation on economic grounds. Once a market failure has been identified, the proposed regulatory solution must itself survive a rigorous economic cost-benefit analysis, one that factors in the potential for unintended consequences. Economists also developed robust evidence that regulation often benefitted producers and harmed consumers. 37 In monopolistic industries, there was evidence that regulation failed to solve the conflict between allocative and producer efficiency and did not keep prices below monopoly levels. In more competitive industries, there was evidence that regulation supported prices above costs and prevented new firms from entering the market, thereby distorting 34 Id. competition. A recent study found that a substantial easing (one standard deviation) in anticompetitive regulation can raise the productivity growth rate by more than one percent, leading to productivity at least ten percent higher over the long run. 38 In addition, the efficiency losses from rent-seeking efforts by market participants to influence regulation go beyond the deadweight loss associated with the creation of entry barriers. These activities also siphon resources from productive to redistributive uses as long as it is possible to use government to gain a monopoly.
With regard to regulators' motivation, Nobel Laureate James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock developed "public choice" economics to help explain why legislators and regulators performed in ways that did not necessarily benefit a majority of consumer-voters. Pubic choice economists observed three important facts about regulation: (1) regulatory legislation redistributes wealth; (2) the behavior of legislators is driven by their desire to remain in office, which means that legislation is designed to maximize political support; and (3) interest groups compete by offering political support in exchange for favorable legislation. Considering these facts together, "[t]he general result that follows is that regulation is likely to be biased toward benefitting interest groups that are better organized . . . and gain more from favorable legislation[, and] is likely to benefit small interest groups with strongly felt preferences at the cost of large interest groups with weakly felt preferences."
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These insights help us understand the related concept of regulatory capture, which posits that regulation is either "supplied in response to the industry's demand for regulation (in other words, legislatures are captured by the industry) or the regulatory agency comes to be controlled by the industry over time (in other words, regulators are captured by the industry)." 40 Public choice and regulatory economics provide insights into the causes of the observed fact that regulation often favors producers rather than consumers. Public choice economics, regulatory economics, and the history of regulation in the United States also offer many lessens to the modern regulator. First, public restraints are especially pernicious for consumers and an especially worthy target for competition agencies. Second, regulators and competition enforcers should use all of their available tools, and in particular competition enforcement, which has enormous deterrent potential, to fight restraints of trade. Third, there should be a strong but rebuttable presumption against regulation favoring incumbents over new entrants or accepting invitations from disgruntled firms to have the competition agencies sue their rivals.
Chapter VII. Legal Liabilities-Fines and Disgorgement
Article 47 provides that, " [w] here an undertaking, in violation of the provisions of the [AML], abuses its dominant market position, [the AML agencies] shall instruct it to discontinue such violation, confiscate its unlawful gains, and impose on it a fine of not less than one percent but not more than 10 percent of its sales achieved in the previous year." We respectfully urge that this article be revised to: (1) omit the requirement that either disgorgement or a minimum 38 13 fine be imposed; (2) specify that "sales" is limited to sales directly obtained in the relevant product and geographic market in China affected by the violation; and (3) state that the AML agencies will pursue disgorgement only against naked price-fixing agreements among competitors or, in the case of unilateral conduct, only if the dominant firm's conduct had no plausible efficiency justification.
The third revision is necessary to ensure that, with respect to conduct that can be efficient and benefit consumers in some contexts and harm competition and consumers in others (e.g., vertical restraints imposed by a firm with market power), competition enforcers do not deter efficient conduct that would otherwise benefit consumers. 41 As we explained in our discussion of Chapter II, above, vertical restraints rarely harm competition and often benefit consumers; they also present the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive conduct and, as such, are generally inappropriate candidates for disgorgement.
Chapter VIII. Supplementary ArticlesArticle 55 on the Application of the AML to IPRs (Questions 5)
We respectfully recommend that Article 55 be revised as follows:
This Law [the AML] is not applicable to undertakings who exercise their intellectual property rights in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights, which includes the right to exclude; however, the Law shall be applicable to undertakings who eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights. This Article does not create a standalone violation for the abuse of intellectual property rights. Conduct will be found to violate this Law only if it constitutes a violation of Articles 13 or 14.
Economic literature shows that IPRs-a central feature of which is the right to excludeincentivize the creation of inventions, ideas, and original works. 42 They also facilitate the sale and licensing of intellectual property (IP) by defining the scope of property right protection and lowering transaction costs, and they produce incentives to develop alternative technologies as well as improvements and other derivative uses.
The incentive function of IPRs is illustrated by considering the sale of an invention in the absence of enforceable IPRs. The sale of an invention requires disclosure to the potential buyer.
In the absence of enforceable IPRs, the potential buyer-now with knowledge of the inventionhas no incentive to purchase or license the invention. This possibility deters the seller from disclosing the invention in the first place. Enforceable property rights solve this problem by allowing the seller to disclose the invention without fear that it will be lawfully appropriated without compensation. The inventor can anticipate the ability to appropriate the returns from investment in producing the invention, which serves as an incentive to invest in producing and to disclose the invention in the first place.
The economic literature also focuses on the related issue of the optimal tradeoff between these incentives and the ability to use the invention. 43 Inventions and works protected by IPRs are non-rivalrous, that is, one firm using a specific IPR does not diminish the ability of another firm to use the same IPR. Also, the cost of having another firm use an existing IPR is effectively zero. As a consequence, from a static welfare perspective, it is desirable to disseminate IPRs to every firm (or consumer) that values the IPR. Of course, doing so would create a strong disincentive to innovate in the first place, to the great detriment of dynamic efficiency, which refers to the gains that result from new ways of doing business. While static efficiency may increase consumer welfare in the short run, economics teaches us that dynamic efficiency, including societal gains from innovation, are an even greater driver of consumer welfare. 44 After the investments and competitive effort required to spur breakthrough inventions have been made and proven successful, it can be tempting to carve up the benefits and distribute them throughout the economy. Doing so, however, would harm competition, innovation, and consumers. If the government is too willing to step in and appropriate the gains from innovation and dynamic competition, then potential innovators anticipating such interventions will have weak incentives to invest in innovation. Likewise, if the laws governing abuse of IPRs is uncertain or unpredictable (which they would be if the prohibition of "unfairly high pricing" is applied to IPRs), then potential innovators will also have weak incentives to innovate.
Conclusion
We appreciate the opportunity to comment and would be happy to respond to any questions the CUPL may have regarding this comment. 43 Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 42. 
